Redis authentication or key ACL boundary failure
An anonymous or restricted client can read a key outside the service's intended access policy.
Candidate CWE: CWE-862 · CWE-863
Test hypothesis#
On an owned fixture, compare one exact canary GET without inherited credentials, with the allowed account and with the restricted account. Keep the endpoint and known key constant; do not enumerate keyspace.
Evidence required#
Source and account identity, exact GET response containing the synthetic marker, effective ACL and the expected denial control.
Rule out false positives#
An intentionally permitted anonymous health command, absent keys, connectivity failure, inherited REDISCLI_AUTH credentials, or broad-looking network exposure protected by appropriate ACLs.
Playbook and command references#
- Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.