# Redis authentication or key ACL boundary failure

An anonymous or restricted client can read a key outside the service's intended access policy.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-862](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html) · [CWE-863](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html)

## Test hypothesis

On an owned fixture, compare one exact canary GET without inherited credentials, with the allowed account and with the restricted account. Keep the endpoint and known key constant; do not enumerate keyspace.

## Evidence required

Source and account identity, exact GET response containing the synthetic marker, effective ACL and the expected denial control.

## Rule out false positives

An intentionally permitted anonymous health command, absent keys, connectivity failure, inherited REDISCLI_AUTH credentials, or broad-looking network exposure protected by appropriate ACLs.

## Playbook and command references

- [Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/network-service-boundaries.html) — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Database%2C%20cache%2C%20queue%20and%20management%20service%20boundaries)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Network services](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/network.html) · [Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html) · [OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [Redis security model](https://redis.io/docs/latest/operate/oss_and_stack/management/security/)
- [Redis CLI authentication behavior](https://redis.io/docs/latest/develop/tools/cli/)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)