PostgreSQL trust authentication exceeds the approved network boundary
An unintended source can connect as a protected database identity without the required authentication because an effective trust rule applies.
Candidate CWE: CWE-306
Test hypothesis#
Using the owner-supplied fixture account and canary database, compare connection from intended and disallowed controlled sources. Clear password/service inheritance for the unauthenticated case, record the selected pg_hba rule and read one canary row.
Evidence required#
Source address, connection type, database/user, authentication logs or effective trust rule, and a canary result with credentials demonstrably absent.
Rule out false positives#
Authorized local socket administration, a supplied password file authenticating the connection, another valid authentication method, or a trust entry that never matches the tested path.
Playbook and command references#
- Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.