# PostgreSQL trust authentication exceeds the approved network boundary

An unintended source can connect as a protected database identity without the required authentication because an effective trust rule applies.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-306](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html)

## Test hypothesis

Using the owner-supplied fixture account and canary database, compare connection from intended and disallowed controlled sources. Clear password/service inheritance for the unauthenticated case, record the selected pg_hba rule and read one canary row.

## Evidence required

Source address, connection type, database/user, authentication logs or effective trust rule, and a canary result with credentials demonstrably absent.

## Rule out false positives

Authorized local socket administration, a supplied password file authenticating the connection, another valid authentication method, or a trust entry that never matches the tested path.

## Playbook and command references

- [Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/network-service-boundaries.html) — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Database%2C%20cache%2C%20queue%20and%20management%20service%20boundaries)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Network services](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/network.html) · [Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html) · [OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [PostgreSQL host authentication rules](https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/auth-pg-hba-conf.html)
- [PostgreSQL connection parameters](https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/libpq-connect.html)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)