Workload creation grants unintended service-account authority
An allowed workload-creation path lets a tenant select a service account or resource mount exceeding its promised permissions.
Candidate CWE: CWE-266
Test hypothesis#
In the isolated fixture namespace, compare an inert job using its intended service account with the supported selection of a more powerful canary account. Check the admitted pod and one synthetic resource operation.
Evidence required#
Creator identity, submitted spec, admitted/generated workload, selected service account and canary result that the creator cannot obtain directly.
Rule out false positives#
Administrators intentionally allowed to choose all namespace identities, rejected admission, or a powerful-looking account with no effective additional rights.
Playbook and command references#
- Container and Kubernetes isolation — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
- Cloud IAM: trust, delegation and effective permissions — Prove which principal can act on which resource, including cross-account trust, delegated roles and workload federation.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.