# Workload creation grants unintended service-account authority

An allowed workload-creation path lets a tenant select a service account or resource mount exceeding its promised permissions.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-266](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/266.html)

## Test hypothesis

In the isolated fixture namespace, compare an inert job using its intended service account with the supported selection of a more powerful canary account. Check the admitted pod and one synthetic resource operation.

## Evidence required

Creator identity, submitted spec, admitted/generated workload, selected service account and canary result that the creator cannot obtain directly.

## Rule out false positives

Administrators intentionally allowed to choose all namespace identities, rejected admission, or a powerful-looking account with no effective additional rights.

## Playbook and command references

- [Container and Kubernetes isolation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/container-kubernetes.html) — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
- [Cloud IAM: trust, delegation and effective permissions](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/cloud-iam-boundaries.html) — Prove which principal can act on which resource, including cross-account trust, delegated roles and workload federation.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Container%20and%20Kubernetes%20isolation)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html) · [OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [Kubernetes service accounts](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-accounts/)
- [Kubernetes RBAC risks](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)