Keychain accessibility violates the intended lock boundary
A sensitive item or protected key operation is available in a device state that the application’s security policy requires it to deny.
Candidate CWE: CWE-922
Test hypothesis#
Compare one seeded item’s normal unlocked access with the supported locked/background path. Record class, group, synchronization and user-presence requirements separately.
Evidence required#
Actual item attributes, device state, consumer identity, exact recovered marker or permitted key operation and the violated requirement.
Rule out false positives#
Background access and synchronization may be deliberate. Dumping a jailbroken device’s Keychain does not establish an ordinary-app exploit.
Playbook and command references#
- iOS signing capabilities, links and protected data — Connect entitlements and application groups to actual callers, URL transitions and protected key use.
- Client storage, logs, backup and transport trust — Measure where sensitive client state goes, who can retrieve it, and whether transport rejects invalid peers.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.