# Keychain accessibility violates the intended lock boundary

A sensitive item or protected key operation is available in a device state that the application’s security policy requires it to deny.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-922](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/922.html)

## Test hypothesis

Compare one seeded item’s normal unlocked access with the supported locked/background path. Record class, group, synchronization and user-presence requirements separately.

## Evidence required

Actual item attributes, device state, consumer identity, exact recovered marker or permitted key operation and the violated requirement.

## Rule out false positives

Background access and synchronization may be deliberate. Dumping a jailbroken device’s Keychain does not establish an ordinary-app exploit.

## Playbook and command references

- [iOS signing capabilities, links and protected data](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/ios-boundaries.html) — Connect entitlements and application groups to actual callers, URL transitions and protected key use.
- [Client storage, logs, backup and transport trust](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/client-storage-transport.html) — Measure where sensitive client state goes, who can retrieve it, and whether transport rejects invalid peers.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=iOS%20signing%20capabilities%2C%20links%20and%20protected%20data)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Mobile](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/mobile.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [Apple Keychain data protection](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/keychain-data-protection-secb0694df1a/web)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)