Boot or recovery path executes an unverified component
A reachable boot path omits an authenticity check required by the product’s execution trust model.
Candidate CWE: CWE-345
Test hypothesis#
Map normal and recovery stages in matching source/configuration; compare authentic and harmless altered component fixtures using the documented local verifier or emulator. Confirm where execution is gated.
Evidence required#
Exact chip revision, production security configuration, component trust relationships and faithfully observed bypass stage.
Rule out false positives#
Secure boot disabled on an intentionally open development board or a simulator that omits hardware verification is not production bypass proof.
Playbook and command references#
- Firmware update and boot trust: signed bytes, product binding and rollback — Separate download trust, update authorization, image verification, rollback policy and boot enforcement using local artifacts.
- Hardware interfaces: production debug access and protected data — Distinguish diagnostic output from privileged UART, JTAG/SWD and firmware-secret boundary failures on an owned lab unit.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
- T1542.001 · Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware — Only if: A lab demonstration modifies system firmware, such as BIOS/UEFI, to maintain execution/access across boot; record the firmware component, persistence behavior, and recovery procedure. Not established by: Downloading firmware, finding an embedded password, or detecting missing signature checks alone is not firmware persistence. Ordinary application firmware packaging needs component-level analysis.
- T1542.002 · Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware — Only if: A controlled reproduction modifies peripheral/component firmware to preserve execution or access outside the main OS/system firmware, with evidence of that persistence. Not established by: A firmware binary containing a vulnerable library is insufficient. Do not treat every IoT firmware issue as either system firmware or component firmware persistence.