# Boot or recovery path executes an unverified component

A reachable boot path omits an authenticity check required by the product’s execution trust model.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-345](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html)

## Test hypothesis

Map normal and recovery stages in matching source/configuration; compare authentic and harmless altered component fixtures using the documented local verifier or emulator. Confirm where execution is gated.

## Evidence required

Exact chip revision, production security configuration, component trust relationships and faithfully observed bypass stage.

## Rule out false positives

Secure boot disabled on an intentionally open development board or a simulator that omits hardware verification is not production bypass proof.

## Playbook and command references

- [Firmware update and boot trust: signed bytes, product binding and rollback](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/firmware-update.html) — Separate download trust, update authorization, image verification, rollback policy and boot enforcement using local artifacts.
- [Hardware interfaces: production debug access and protected data](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/hardware-interfaces.html) — Distinguish diagnostic output from privileged UART, JTAG/SWD and firmware-secret boundary failures on an owned lab unit.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Firmware%20update%20and%20boot%20trust%3A%20signed%20bytes%2C%20product%20binding%20and%20rollback)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Hardware & firmware](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/hardware.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

- [T1542.001 · Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html#T1542-001) — **Only if:** A lab demonstration modifies system firmware, such as BIOS/UEFI, to maintain execution/access across boot; record the firmware component, persistence behavior, and recovery procedure. **Not established by:** Downloading firmware, finding an embedded password, or detecting missing signature checks alone is not firmware persistence. Ordinary application firmware packaging needs component-level analysis.
- [T1542.002 · Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html#T1542-002) — **Only if:** A controlled reproduction modifies peripheral/component firmware to preserve execution or access outside the main OS/system firmware, with evidence of that persistence. **Not established by:** A firmware binary containing a vulnerable library is insufficient. Do not treat every IoT firmware issue as either system firmware or component firmware persistence.

## Primary references

- [Espressif Secure Boot v2](https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/stable/esp32/security/secure-boot-v2.html)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)