Container exposes unintended host files or privileges
A supported container configuration gives an untrusted workload access to host resources outside the documented isolation boundary.
Candidate CWE: CWE-250
Test hypothesis#
Inspect one owned container's capabilities, host namespaces and mounts. In an isolated host fixture, compare access to a synthetic host marker with the restricted deployment; stop at the smallest demonstrated access.
Evidence required#
Image digest, runtime configuration, UID mapping, specific host resource and canary observation from the restricted workload identity.
Rule out false positives#
Container UID 0 alone, intended privileged administration agents, read-only access that does not meet the claimed impact, or a configuration warning without reachable authority.
Playbook and command references#
- Container and Kubernetes isolation — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
- Infrastructure configuration: from repository default to deployed impact — Trace IaC, charts, Compose and image packaging into supported deployments, including exposed services and sensitive artifacts.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
- T1611 · Escape to Host — Only if: A controlled test shows code or access escaping a container or virtual machine into the underlying host/hypervisor security context. Not established by: Root inside a container is not necessarily host root. A permissive manifest or exposed Docker socket is a hypothesis until its actual boundary effect is established.