# Container exposes unintended host files or privileges

A supported container configuration gives an untrusted workload access to host resources outside the documented isolation boundary.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-250](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/250.html)

## Test hypothesis

Inspect one owned container's capabilities, host namespaces and mounts. In an isolated host fixture, compare access to a synthetic host marker with the restricted deployment; stop at the smallest demonstrated access.

## Evidence required

Image digest, runtime configuration, UID mapping, specific host resource and canary observation from the restricted workload identity.

## Rule out false positives

Container UID 0 alone, intended privileged administration agents, read-only access that does not meet the claimed impact, or a configuration warning without reachable authority.

## Playbook and command references

- [Container and Kubernetes isolation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/container-kubernetes.html) — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
- [Infrastructure configuration: from repository default to deployed impact](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/infrastructure-config.html) — Trace IaC, charts, Compose and image packaging into supported deployments, including exposed services and sensitive artifacts.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Container%20and%20Kubernetes%20isolation)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html) · [OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

- [T1611 · Escape to Host](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html#T1611) — **Only if:** A controlled test shows code or access escaping a container or virtual machine into the underlying host/hypervisor security context. **Not established by:** Root inside a container is not necessarily host root. A permissive manifest or exposed Docker socket is a hypothesis until its actual boundary effect is established.

## Primary references

- [Pod Security Standards](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/)
- [Docker Engine security](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)