BUG BOUNTYFIELD MANUAL
Vulnerability reference
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WebAuthn assertion accepted for an invalid account or ceremony context

The relying party accepts a passkey assertion without the required account, challenge, signature, origin, or verification binding.

Candidate CWE: CWE-287 · CWE-347

Test hypothesis#

Start from a working local WebAuthn ceremony. Compare one consumed assertion, one invalid signature, and a validly signed fixture violating one server-side policy. For username-first login, check credential ownership; for discoverable login, check that the user handle and credential resolve to the same account.

Evidence required#

Expected relying-party policy, credential owner, altered validation condition, server acceptance, and resulting protected identity. Identify the verifier check that failed; editing signed bytes alone does not isolate semantic validation.

Rule out false positives#

Valid passwordless login to the credential owner, supported related origins, no attestation requirement, or a zero/non-increasing counter by itself does not prove bypass or cloning.

Playbook and command references#

Find the associated command snippets

Referenced by these target playbooks#

Report checklist#

  • Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
  • Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
  • Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
  • Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
  • State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

Conditional ATT&CK mapping#

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.

Primary references#

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