Web cache poisoning
Unkeyed attacker-controlled input changes a representation later served from shared cache.
Candidate CWE: CWE-349
Test hypothesis#
Prove a dedicated cache namespace. Change one source-confirmed unkeyed input to a harmless marker; request the same key from controlled B without that input and compare a clean key.
Evidence required#
B receives the altered cached representation, supported by origin/cache logs and exact key behavior. Describe the demonstrated output impact and purge test entries.
Rule out false positives#
Reflected input on the initial request, an ignored query cache-buster, or caching isolated to the submitting user is not cross-client poisoning.
Playbook and command references#
- Proxy normalization, cache isolation, and request boundaries — Investigate layered HTTP behavior with isolated cache keys and controlled front-end/back-end traffic.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.