Argument or option injection without shell interpretation
A value-only input changes options or mode of the intended executable, even when no shell is used.
Candidate CWE: CWE-88
Test hypothesis#
In the local product wrapper, compare a normal data argument with a harmless documented mode switch. Capture the final argument array and show that the untrusted caller can select an operation beyond the intended input contract.
Evidence required#
Exact executable, argument vector, source entry point, expected value-only contract, and the resulting protected mode or operation. Keep the canary free of filesystem writes, extra process execution, and network access.
Rule out false positives#
A process intentionally exposing that option, inert argument text, a validation error, or only changing a tool banner does not establish a security consequence. Shell syntax interpretation belongs to CWE-78.
Playbook and command references#
- Trace input into queries, commands, and templates — Prove interpretation at a specific sink using small paired experiments instead of payload spraying.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.