BUG BOUNTYFIELD MANUAL
Vulnerability reference
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OS command injection

An untrusted parameter becomes shell command syntax rather than remaining a data argument.

Candidate CWE: CWE-78

Test hypothesis#

Trace an observed local worker into its subprocess sink. In the disposable replica, use a marker-only printf operation appropriate to that shell, comparing the literal and interpreted paths in process logs.

Evidence required#

The marker comes from shell-command interpretation at the identified sink, with a reproducible input path and attacker preconditions. If only options to the intended executable change, use the separate argument-injection card and CWE-88.

Rule out false positives#

Text reflection, a failed command, and a tool whose documented purpose permits that exact trusted operation are not proof of a boundary violation.

Playbook and command references#

Find the associated command snippets

Referenced by these target playbooks#

Report checklist#

  • Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
  • Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
  • Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
  • Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
  • State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

Conditional ATT&CK mapping#

  • T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing Application — Only if: A demonstrated exploit of an Internet-facing service provides initial access to its host, system, or environment; explain the foothold and trust boundary. Not established by: Not a blanket label for every web/API weakness. A reflected parameter, scanner alert, or ordinary cross-account object read alone does not establish initial network/system access.
  • T1059.004 · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell — Only if: The demonstrated exploit invokes a Unix shell to execute commands; capture the shell invocation or equivalent process evidence in a controlled reproduction. Not established by: Calling an executable directly without a shell, template evaluation, and generic RCE are not automatically Unix Shell. Choose an interpreter only when supported by evidence.

Primary references#

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