Open redirect across an origin trust boundary
Attacker input controls a navigation destination that the application treats as trusted.
Candidate CWE: CWE-601
Test hypothesis#
Capture a normal return URL, change only its destination to a controlled lab origin, and inspect the actual navigation. Compare an approved local path with a denied foreign origin. If the claimed impact is OAuth leakage, reproduce the additional token or code transfer on your own client and account; a redirect alone is not that chain.
Evidence required#
Preserve the initiating URL, validation decision, Location or browser destination, and the smallest demonstrated trust violation. Document whether a warning or explicit user choice intervenes.
Rule out false positives#
A documented external redirect service, a plain external link, or an origin rejected before navigation may be intended behavior. A phishing hypothesis alone does not prove account takeover.
Playbook and command references#
- Browser execution, cross-origin reads, and forged actions — Use real browser behavior to distinguish XSS, CSRF, CORS, and messaging failures from header-only leads.
- Authentication, recovery, federation, and session lifecycle — Test registration, recovery, identity changes, invitations, SSO enforcement, and deprovisioning as one account state machine.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.