Untrusted model artifact reaches executable deserialization or custom code
An attacker-controlled artifact reaches a loader whose execution trust exceeds the uploader's intended data-only authority.
Candidate CWE: CWE-502 · CWE-829
Test hypothesis#
Trace the supported upload/import route into its actual loader. In a disposable credential-free local runtime, compare a harmless executable marker fixture with an ordinary tensor artifact and the intended rejection control.
Evidence required#
Record artifact hash, uploader rights, loader/runtime version and options, production-equivalent call path, marker side effect and isolation limitations. These CWE candidates are alternatives: CWE-502 requires unsafe deserialization; CWE-829 concerns loading functionality from an untrusted control sphere. Trace the actual loader and execution path rather than assigning both from a model filename.
Rule out false positives#
Explicitly opting into reviewed trusted repository code is a different trust contract. A risky loader name, static string, or an unsupported local loading path does not establish hosted impact.
Playbook and command references#
- Source review: entry point to protected operation — Trace attacker control and authorization through handlers, services, queues, and sensitive operations; promote only reachable violations of a stated invariant.
- OSS lab: pin, install, prove, reset — Turn an eligible release into a repeatable synthetic environment with preserved versions, realistic controls, and an explicit reset recipe.
- AI tools: input trust, execution identity and approvals — Prove when lower-trust content changes a protected tool action, then locate the missing authorization or consent boundary.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.