Namespace or workload network restriction is ineffective
A disallowed fixture workload reaches a service across a network boundary that the deployment claims to enforce.
Candidate CWE: CWE-923
Test hypothesis#
Create one inert marker endpoint and two owned source pods. Compare one request from the allowed source and one from the denied source with the same destination and port; record labels, policy direction and CNI.
Evidence required#
Successful allowed control, disallowed-source marker response, source/destination identity and applicable policies plus enforcing implementation. CWE-923 is a candidate when the failed boundary permits communication with an unintended endpoint. Refine to the actual selector, permission-assignment, or enforcement mistake when supported; do not infer a particular implementation error from connectivity alone.
Rule out false positives#
A timeout while the service is broken, intentionally allowed egress, unsupported policy semantics, or a lab missing the production network plugin.
Playbook and command references#
- Container and Kubernetes isolation — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
- Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.