Extension input crosses an iOS shared-container boundary
The main application trusts content written through a lower-trust extension/input path as if it were an authorized app action.
Candidate CWE: CWE-863
Test hypothesis#
Map group membership and intended sharing, import one synthetic document through the real extension, and compare the main app’s treatment of expected and invalid metadata.
Evidence required#
Entitlements, signed participants, share-sheet or other real entry, controlled file/message and the resulting protected operation.
Rule out false positives#
App Group membership is not itself a leak. Signing the attacker app with the victim team or granting matching entitlements changes the attacker model.
Playbook and command references#
- iOS signing capabilities, links and protected data — Connect entitlements and application groups to actual callers, URL transitions and protected key use.
- Uploads, downloads, paths, archives, and XML — Follow a file through acceptance, storage, processing, publication, and retrieval while preserving ownership and path boundaries.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.