Restricted DNS zone transferable from an unintended source
An unauthorized source can retrieve an entire zone that the owner intends to restrict.
Candidate CWE: CWE-732
Test hypothesis#
Use one explicitly owned, small fixture zone and a single AXFR request to its approved authoritative server. Compare the permitted transfer source with the restricted source, preserving transport and source identity.
Evidence required#
The exact zone, source addresses, full fixture transfer bracketed by SOA records and the owner's transfer-access rule.
Rule out false positives#
Intentionally published zones, a legitimate secondary server, ordinary public DNS queries, or an incomplete transfer response without the claimed disclosure.
Playbook and command references#
- DNS, TLS and email trust boundaries — Separate dangling records, transfer/recursion exposure, TLS identity and SMTP relay into controlled protocol tests.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.