DNS recursion available outside the intended client network
A resolver performs recursive lookups for a client excluded by its intended access policy.
Candidate CWE: CWE-862 · CWE-863
Test hypothesis#
From an owned disallowed source, send one unique query for a record in the researcher's authoritative zone through the approved resolver. Compare the permitted-source control and correlate the authoritative callback.
Evidence required#
Resolver/source identities, unique query and response, authoritative log and intended recursion ACL. No spoofed-source or amplification testing is needed. Determine whether recursion authorization is missing (CWE-862) or an implemented check accepts the wrong client (CWE-863); do not substitute the high-level CWE-284 for that root-cause analysis.
Rule out false positives#
A public recursive service by design, cached responses, an authoritative answer, or the RA flag without proof the resolver performed the lookup.
Playbook and command references#
- DNS, TLS and email trust boundaries — Separate dangling records, transfer/recursion exposure, TLS identity and SMTP relay into controlled protocol tests.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.