Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
A browser can be induced to perform a protected state change using ambient credentials.
Candidate CWE: CWE-352
Test hypothesis#
Capture a normal reversible setting change. Reproduce it from a controlled other site using browser-deliverable data, without inserting a victim bearer token. Compare an invalid proof and logged-out control.
Evidence required#
The actual browser sends required credentials and commits the unauthorized setting change. Save the initiating page, cookie behavior, request, and independent before/after state.
Rule out false positives#
A missing token, manual proxy replay, preflight-blocked JSON request, or request sent without the required cookies is not enough.
Playbook and command references#
- Browser execution, cross-origin reads, and forged actions — Use real browser behavior to distinguish XSS, CSRF, CORS, and messaging failures from header-only leads.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.