Encrypted data accepted without integrity authentication
A protected data format permits security-relevant changes that are not detected before use.
Candidate CWE: CWE-353
Test hypothesis#
Identify the encryption mode and where integrity is checked. Save a valid synthetic message, change a controlled field or authenticated context in the local fixture, and compare processing with an invalid-tag control. Trace whether downstream code consumes plaintext before verification.
Evidence required#
Show the accepted modified value and resulting forbidden state; document key, nonce, tag, associated-data and parser assumptions. Nonce reuse is a separate cryptographic defect that needs its own demonstration.
Rule out false positives#
Encryption without an explicit MAC in one function may still be protected by authenticated encryption or an outer signed envelope. A rejected corruption or parser error is not authenticated forgery.
Playbook and command references#
- Source review: entry point to protected operation — Trace attacker control and authorization through handlers, services, queues, and sensitive operations; promote only reachable violations of a stated invariant.
- Uploads, downloads, paths, archives, and XML — Follow a file through acceptance, storage, processing, publication, and retrieval while preserving ownership and path boundaries.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.