Contract initializer permits unauthorized ownership or configuration
A reachable initialization path lets an ordinary actor establish or replace privileged state outside the intended deployment lifecycle.
Candidate CWE: CWE-862
Test hypothesis#
In a faithful local deployment, compare intended initialization, a repeated initialization attempt and an ordinary actor’s attempt against the proxy or relevant instance. Check actual storage and roles.
Evidence required#
Proxy/implementation identity, initialization state, caller role, accepted transition and resulting protected capability.
Rule out false positives#
Initializing an unused implementation does not automatically compromise its proxy; prove how the changed state matters.
Playbook and command references#
- Contract state: authorization, callbacks and accounting — Turn protocol promises into explicit invariants and test realistic local operation sequences with independent accounting.
- Object, function, and property authorization — Turn identities, tenants, objects, roles, and lifecycle transitions into a reproducible permission matrix.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.