Signed action does not bind its intended context
A valid signature is accepted for another recipient, action, verifier or chain context contrary to the authorization contract.
Candidate CWE: CWE-345
Test hypothesis#
Generate a local baseline signature, then vary exactly one intended binding in a fresh local setup: recipient, amount, verifier instance or chain context. Compare recovered signer and accepted state change.
Evidence required#
Message schema, domain, differing context field, verifier logic and unintended local operation.
Rule out false positives#
Intentionally portable authorizations and unsupported signing paths require a demonstrated conflicting guarantee.
Playbook and command references#
- Contract signatures and oracles: context, freshness and units — Test signed-action context and price-consumer assumptions with local keys, mock feeds and explicit negative controls.
- Authentication, recovery, federation, and session lifecycle — Test registration, recovery, identity changes, invitations, SSO enforcement, and deprovisioning as one account state machine.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.