Container daemon management endpoint lacks required client authentication
An untrusted network client reaches protected container-management functionality without the required identity checks.
Candidate CWE: CWE-306
Test hypothesis#
Inspect the owned daemon's listener, TLS/client-certificate policy and trusted proxy behavior. Compare an approved protected metadata request with and without the fixture client identity; stop before workload creation or host mounts.
Evidence required#
Endpoint ownership, actual management API response, missing required authentication and configuration corroborating the affected authority. State any untested administrative operations as unproven.
Rule out false positives#
A public health/version endpoint behind a correctly restricted management proxy, an already trusted local socket, or TLS encryption mistakenly assumed to require client certificates.
Playbook and command references#
- Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.
- Container and Kubernetes isolation — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.