Unauthorized object creation or replacement
An unauthorized principal can create or replace an object in a protected storage location.
Candidate CWE: CWE-732
Test hypothesis#
Reserve a disposable key with the owner, record its initial marker/version, then attempt one inert write as the disallowed fixture identity. Have the owner confirm the resulting bytes and clean up every fixture version.
Evidence required#
Protected prefix/key rule, writer identity, accepted write request, owner-confirmed marker/version and secure comparison.
Rule out false positives#
Intentionally anonymous uploads confined to a quarantine area, a returned upload URL that cannot write, or writing only to the caller's allowed prefix.
Playbook and command references#
- Object storage, signed URLs and delivery boundaries — Follow one private canary through upload, signing, CDN delivery and expiry without enumerating real objects.
- Azure and GCP: identity, delegation and storage access — Apply provider-specific controls for Azure management/data permissions and SAS, plus GCP service accounts, federation and object ACLs.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.