BUG BOUNTYFIELD MANUAL
Vulnerability reference
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Signed storage capability exceeds its authorized scope

The application issues or accepts a storage capability for an object, operation or lifetime beyond the caller's entitlement.

Candidate CWE: CWE-863

Test hypothesis#

Compare normal signing for A's fixture with signing for B's owned fixture. Separately compare the allowed method/key and the documented expiry case, changing one input at a time.

Evidence required#

A's identity, B's ownership, issuance request, capability scope, timestamps and successful canary operation. Redact the usable signature.

Rule out false positives#

A legitimately issued presigned URL works without the user's session, is reusable before expiry, or lasts within the explicitly documented sharing policy.

Playbook and command references#

Find the associated command snippets

Referenced by these target playbooks#

Report checklist#

  • Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
  • Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
  • Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
  • Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
  • State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

Conditional ATT&CK mapping#

  • T1530 · Data from Cloud Storage — Only if: A demonstrated authorization or configuration failure permits collection of a controlled confidential object from an actual cloud storage service, including supported SaaS storage contexts. Not established by: A bucket name, public-by-design file, general BOLA, or any API response simply hosted in the cloud is insufficient. Establish the storage context and protected data boundary.

Primary references#

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