Sensitive client state leaks through accessible diagnostics
Logs, crash reports or user-exportable diagnostics disclose a secret or private record to a principal outside its intended audience.
Candidate CWE: CWE-532
Test hypothesis#
Perform one marked action, inspect its relevant release diagnostic output, and obtain that output using only the stated reader privileges. Compare a logged-out run.
Evidence required#
Logging source/sink, redacted synthetic value, release build, who can read/export it and a concrete confidentiality or token-reuse consequence.
Rule out false positives#
A debug-only log or ADB access does not prove another app can read it. Redacted identifiers and nonsensitive telemetry are not automatically secrets.
Playbook and command references#
- Client storage, logs, backup and transport trust — Measure where sensitive client state goes, who can retrieve it, and whether transport rejects invalid peers.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
- T1552.001 · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files — Only if: The tested path retrieves credentials from insufficiently protected configuration, source, log, archive, or other files; retain only redacted evidence and location details. Not established by: A high-entropy string, sample credential, or accessible file without authentication material is insufficient. Reading arbitrary non-secret data is a different behavior.