Local authentication does not gate the protected operation
A local PIN or biometric screen is bypassed through another reachable path while the supposedly protected data/key operation remains usable.
Candidate CWE: CWE-288
Test hypothesis#
Record legitimate unlock, then invoke an alternative supported route without satisfying local authentication. Limit the operation to a seeded private item.
Evidence required#
Documented protection promise, attacker access prerequisites, actual denied and alternate paths, and usable plaintext or key operation.
Rule out false positives#
Changing a return value with privileged instrumentation may only demonstrate the privileges you supplied. A UI preference that never promises a security boundary needs separate impact.
Playbook and command references#
- iOS signing capabilities, links and protected data — Connect entitlements and application groups to actual callers, URL transitions and protected key use.
- Client storage, logs, backup and transport trust — Measure where sensitive client state goes, who can retrieve it, and whether transport rejects invalid peers.
- Authentication, recovery, federation, and session lifecycle — Test registration, recovery, identity changes, invitations, SSO enforcement, and deprovisioning as one account state machine.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.