Clickjacking of a sensitive authenticated action
An untrusted origin can frame and visually disguise an authenticated operation.
Candidate CWE: CWE-1021
Test hypothesis#
On two controlled origins, embed the target page and establish whether its session remains usable in the frame. Align a harmless synthetic setting action and demonstrate the intended click changes that setting. Compare a protected sibling route and test the actual browser framing policy.
Evidence required#
Capture browser version, frame response policy, authenticated frame state, the interaction, and the before/after setting. Explain any required user gesture or extra confirmation.
Rule out false positives#
Missing X-Frame-Options is insufficient when CSP frame-ancestors blocks framing. A frameable public page, an unauthenticated frame, or an operation requiring undisguisable reauthentication does not establish the same impact.
Playbook and command references#
- Browser execution, cross-origin reads, and forged actions — Use real browser behavior to distinguish XSS, CSRF, CORS, and messaging failures from header-only leads.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.