Authentication or MFA state bypass
A session that has not completed required authentication can perform protected operations.
Candidate CWE: CWE-287
Test hypothesis#
Stop a controlled login before MFA or verification completion. Make one private profile request using its intermediate credential. Compare with a completed session and an anonymous request.
Evidence required#
Protected controlled data or an action is available without the required step. Record actual authentication state, route, credential source, and resulting identity.
Rule out false positives#
Issuing an intermediate token, showing a login shell, or allowing explicitly public profile data is not a bypass.
Playbook and command references#
- Authentication, recovery, federation, and session lifecycle — Test registration, recovery, identity changes, invitations, SSO enforcement, and deprovisioning as one account state machine.
- REST, GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, and SSE permission parity — Carry the same permission invariant across protocols, nested fields, streams, and alternate API versions.
- MFA and passkeys: enrollment, proof, replacement, and recovery — Follow each authenticator from account binding to removal, and validate WebAuthn assertions without mistaking client UI or counter behavior for a security guarantee.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.