PendingIntent grants unintended mutable or replayable authority
A recipient can alter or reuse a delegated action beyond its intended destination, parameters or lifetime.
Candidate CWE: CWE-863
Test hypothesis#
Obtain a token through a supported test-app interaction. Compare its intended action with one harmless altered field or repeat of a documented single-use action.
Evidence required#
How the attacker receives the token, creation flags, mutable fields, expected lifetime and demonstrated unauthorized action.
Rule out false positives#
Mutable or reusable PendingIntents can be intentional. Flag absence alone does not show abuse; the receiver may enforce the required policy.
Playbook and command references#
- Android components, intents and deep links — Trace ordinary-app inputs through exported components, URI grants and links to one protected operation.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.