Nested intent redirects application authority
An exported entry point forwards attacker-supplied intent fields into a protected destination using the target application’s authority.
Candidate CWE: CWE-441
Test hypothesis#
Trace one legitimate forwarding path, then substitute a harmless lab destination while preserving other fields. Repeat from an ordinary app on the supported OS.
Evidence required#
Original and nested intents, controlled fields, caller/target identities, invoked capability and platform enforcement result.
Rule out false positives#
A forwarded public action is insufficient. Android 16 hardening can affect reachability; an older emulator or an opt-out test build cannot establish every release is affected.
Playbook and command references#
- Android components, intents and deep links — Trace ordinary-app inputs through exported components, URI grants and links to one protected operation.
Find the associated command snippets
Referenced by these target playbooks#
Report checklist#
- Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.
Conditional ATT&CK mapping#
No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the mapping guide.