# Attacker-controlled rollback restores a prohibited security state

An attacker bypasses an update version authorization policy to cause a rollback that restores a prohibited security state.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-863](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html)

## Test hypothesis

In a local update fixture, compare current and older authentic versions under unchanged verifier policy. Show how the attacker supplies the older artifact without signing or administrative authority.

## Evidence required

Rollback policy, exact versions, artifact authenticity, attacker control and the concrete restored security consequence.

## Rule out false positives

Supported manual downgrade, administrator-selected rollback, or older-version installation alone is insufficient. Explicit ADB downgrade flags do not demonstrate a bypass. Select the final CWE from the demonstrated root cause; algorithm negotiation and hardware security-version CWEs do not automatically apply.

## Playbook and command references

- [Update signatures, rollback and privileged installation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/update-integrity.html) — Test the update decision and installation boundary while preserving production signer and privilege assumptions.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Update%20signatures%2C%20rollback%20and%20privileged%20installation)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Desktop & extensions](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/desktop.html) · [Mobile](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/mobile.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [Android application signing and update identity](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing)
- [Electron updater behavior](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/auto-updater)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)