# Untrusted WebView content reaches a native bridge

A page or frame controlled outside the trusted app origin can invoke native capabilities through a shipped WebView bridge.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-749](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/749.html)

## Test hypothesis

Load a harmless owned page via a supported navigation/import feature; exercise one exposed method against a seeded lab resource and compare a trusted-origin control.

## Evidence required

Real content entry path, origin/frame, bridge name, reachable method, native operation and actual caller permissions.

## Rule out false positives

A bridge declaration, JavaScript execution alone, or developer-injected code is insufficient. Prove both the untrusted entry and native effect.

## Playbook and command references

- [Android components, intents and deep links](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/android-components.html) — Trace ordinary-app inputs through exported components, URI grants and links to one protected operation.
- [iOS signing capabilities, links and protected data](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/ios-boundaries.html) — Connect entitlements and application groups to actual callers, URL transitions and protected key use.
- [Browser execution, cross-origin reads, and forged actions](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/browser-trust.html) — Use real browser behavior to distinguish XSS, CSRF, CORS, and messaging failures from header-only leads.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Android%20components%2C%20intents%20and%20deep%20links)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[Mobile](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/mobile.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [Android WebView native bridges](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/risks/insecure-webview-native-bridges)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)