# Indirect prompt injection into protected tool actions

Lower-trust retrieved content influences the agent into a tool operation outside the legitimate task or granted authority.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-1427](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1427.html)

## Test hypothesis

Compare a benign document with a copy containing a harmless stub-action instruction. Keep the owned victim task and tool set constant; compare attempted and committed mock events over a fixed small trial count.

## Evidence required

Exact legitimate task, edited source, document hash, acting identity, tool arguments and unauthorized synthetic side effect; report successes/attempts.

## Rule out false positives

Style changes, policy refusals and fabricated action claims do not prove a protected boundary was crossed.

## Playbook and command references

- [AI tools: input trust, execution identity and approvals](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/ai-tool-trust.html) — Prove when lower-trust content changes a protected tool action, then locate the missing authorization or consent boundary.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=AI%20tools%3A%20input%20trust%2C%20execution%20identity%20and%20approvals)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[AI, agents & MCP](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/ai.html) · [OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [CWE-1427: LLM prompting input](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1427.html)
- [OWASP Excessive Agency](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)