# GitLab job token crosses an unintended project boundary

A contribution-controlled job acquires access to a private receiving-project resource beyond the CI integration contract.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-863](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html)

## Test hypothesis

Use two owned projects and one private synthetic artifact. Compare the same resource request from the intended job context and a disallowed controlled project/actor. Record receiving-project allowlist, feature visibility, fine-grained restrictions, and triggering-user permissions; do not assume allowlisting alone grants access.

## Evidence required

Pipeline and job IDs, source/receiving project IDs, trigger actor, exact canary and allowed/denied results, with token values redacted.

## Rule out false positives

Intentionally public artifacts, an expired token, a denied endpoint, or access deliberately granted to the triggering user and originating project.

## Playbook and command references

- [GitLab pipelines: contribution, job token and runner boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/gitlab-pipeline-boundaries.html) — Trace GitLab execution context, included configuration, downstream inputs, job-token permissions and runner reuse using private synthetic fixtures.
- [CI and releases: trace untrusted input into privileged work](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/supply-chain-ci.html) — Audit workflow events, shell interpolation, untrusted builds, artifact consumers, and release identity as one privilege chain.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=GitLab%20pipelines%3A%20contribution%2C%20job%20token%20and%20runner%20boundaries)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html) · [Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

No direct ATT&CK mapping selected. Record the weakness and demonstrated impact without forcing an adversary-behavior classification. See the [mapping guide](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html).

## Primary references

- [GitLab job-token permissions](https://docs.gitlab.com/ci/jobs/ci_job_token/)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)