# Dependency confusion and unintended package origin

Dependency resolution selects an attacker-controlled package origin where the build or application expects an organization-controlled package.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-829](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/829.html)

## Test hypothesis

Inspect resolver configuration, namespace ownership, lock/integrity handling, and fallback rules. Reproduce with two local registries and synthetic package names using the relevant package-manager version. Record origin selection and whether install/build/runtime code would consume it; do not register real missing package names.

## Evidence required

Exact dependency and resolver configuration, package-manager version, local registry logs, selected package origin/version/hash, and affected consumer/build context. Separate resolver behavior from unconfirmed public namespace control.

## Rule out false positives

Private index mapping, exclusive source constraints, verified hashes, or immutable resolution prevents the alternate package from being selected. A public package of the same name existing is not enough.

## Playbook and command references

- [Dependencies: from advisory match to reachable impact](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/dependency-reachability.html) — Separate composition, advisory matching, runtime reachability, and exploit prerequisites so dependency reports describe product impact.
- [CI and releases: trace untrusted input into privileged work](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/supply-chain-ci.html) — Audit workflow events, shell interpolation, untrusted builds, artifact consumers, and release identity as one privilege chain.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=Dependencies%3A%20from%20advisory%20match%20to%20reachable%20impact)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html) · [Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html) · [Desktop & extensions](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/desktop.html) · [Mobile](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/mobile.html) · [AI, agents & MCP](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/ai.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

- [T1195.001 · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html#T1195-001) — **Only if:** A controlled reproduction shows maliciously modified dependency or development-tool content being consumed through a software supply chain, such as a substituted reusable build action. **Not established by:** An old vulnerable dependency, an SBOM finding, or arbitrary CI log access does not prove supply-chain compromise. Show the manipulated component and consumer path.

## Primary references

- [pip install: index selection](https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/cli/pip_install/)
- [MITRE CWE-829](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/829.html)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)