# CI metadata interpreted as executable script

Pull-request titles, branch metadata, issue fields, or artifact values are inserted into a generated shell/program instead of being handled as data.

**Candidate CWE:** [CWE-94](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html)

## Test hypothesis

Trace the exact expression from event payload to `run:` or generated script. Reproduce in a private fixture with dummy credentials and an inert marker; compare an environment-variable/data-argument implementation. Check subsequent `eval` or command construction even when the first transfer is safe.

## Evidence required

Attacker role, triggering event, workflow/action revision, generated script, marker-only result, job permissions, and comparison control. Claim only capabilities supported by the actual job context.

## Rule out false positives

A value remains a quoted data argument without later interpretation; attacker cannot supply that event field; or a privileged capability is assumed but absent.

## Playbook and command references

- [CI and releases: trace untrusted input into privileged work](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/supply-chain-ci.html) — Audit workflow events, shell interpolation, untrusted builds, artifact consumers, and release identity as one privilege chain.
- [GitLab pipelines: contribution, job token and runner boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/gitlab-pipeline-boundaries.html) — Trace GitLab execution context, included configuration, downstream inputs, job-token permissions and runner reuse using private synthetic fixtures.

[Find the associated command snippets](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/commands.html?q=CI%20and%20releases%3A%20trace%20untrusted%20input%20into%20privileged%20work)

## Referenced by these target playbooks

[OSS & self-hosted](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/oss.html) · [Cloud & containers](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/cloud.html)

## Report checklist

- [ ] Capture the affected version, configuration, identities, and object ownership.
- [ ] Preserve a valid baseline and a negative control.
- [ ] Reproduce the forbidden data access, action, or state change on controlled fixtures.
- [ ] Explain the intended security rule and why the observed behavior violates it.
- [ ] State prerequisites, uncertainty, cleanup, and the smallest demonstrated impact.

## Conditional ATT&CK mapping

- [T1059.004 · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html#T1059-004) — **Only if:** The demonstrated exploit invokes a Unix shell to execute commands; capture the shell invocation or equivalent process evidence in a controlled reproduction. **Not established by:** Calling an executable directly without a shell, template evaluation, and generic RCE are not automatically Unix Shell. Choose an interpreter only when supported by evidence.
- [T1195.002 · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/attack.html#T1195-002) — **Only if:** A controlled release/update workflow accepts modified application code or a substituted compiled artifact before delivery to its final consumer; prove consumption in a lab. **Not established by:** Access to a build log, ability to upload an unused artifact, or an ordinary software vulnerability does not establish malicious software distribution.

## Primary references

- [GitHub Actions secure use](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use)

[Back to the complete vulnerability catalog](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities.html)