# Cloud, containers, Kubernetes and infrastructure as code

The hunting unit is a **principal acting on a resource across a promised boundary**. A cloud-hosted application, its customer's cloud account, the underlying managed service, and the cloud provider are separate scopes. A public hostname or uploaded domain inventory does not establish ownership of the backing bucket, account, cluster, CDN distribution or SaaS tenant.

## Scope and provider policy

Record the provider, account/project/subscription ID, tenant or organization ID, region, exact resource identifier, endpoint, permitted principal and excluded adjacent services. For containers, add image repository and digest, runtime, host ownership and allowed execution environment. For Kubernetes, add cluster/context, namespace, service account, controller and control-plane ownership. For IaC, add repository commit, module/provider versions, workspace and whether generated plans or deployed infrastructure are included.

Provider permission and program permission must both cover the activity. A SaaS program can authorize application testing without authorizing customer-owned integrations or the CSP control plane. Conversely, a provider's permission to test your own resources does not make another customer's resources available.

| Provider | Current operational rule | Hunting implication |
|---|---|---|
| AWS | Listed services may be tested without prior approval; unlisted services require AWS engagement. Testing AWS infrastructure/services themselves is outside this customer policy. C2 needs prior approval. The page explicitly prohibits S3 bucket takeover and subdomain takeover, flooding and specified Route 53 attacks; API Gateway and Bedrock AgentCore are prohibited for outbound penetration testing. | Check the current service/activity list. An application's bounty policy cannot override AWS restrictions. Do not claim dangling AWS resources as a default validation step. [AWS policy](https://aws.amazon.com/security/penetration-testing/) |
| Microsoft/Azure | The unified rules cover owned or explicitly authorized assets. They prohibit third-party data/credential access, including publicly leaked credentials, DoS, excessive automation and post-exploit activity beyond initial identification. They encourage cross-tenant tests using test accounts and require immediate reporting of identified vulnerabilities. | Use two owned trial tenants where applicable. Stop at the initial boundary proof; do not enumerate internal files, dump secrets or pivot. Check the separate bounty scope for reward eligibility. [Microsoft rules](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/pentest-rules-of-engagement) |
| Google Cloud | Prior notification is unnecessary for testing your own projects, provided tests affect only those projects and comply with the AUP and terms. | Project identity matters more than a shared IP range. Provider vulnerabilities follow Google's reporting route; customer application findings follow the customer's program. [Google Cloud FAQ](https://support.google.com/cloud/answer/6262505?hl=en) |

These are policy snapshots checked on 2026-09-11, not permanent permissions. Account inventory commands below are ordinary authorized administration; their presence does not imply that every service is approved for penetration testing.

## Staged playbook

**1. Establish two controlled identities.** Prefer program-provided test credentials or two owned lab tenants, each with synthetic objects. Separate the administrative fixture-creation identity from the low-privilege identity used to reproduce the issue. Record the effective caller before every session. A role called “read only” is not sufficient evidence: inspect permitted actions and data access.

**2. Build the authority graph.** Trace user → application → workload identity → cloud API → resource. Distinguish management-plane permissions from data-plane permissions; a reader of resource configuration may lack blob access, while a workload can have data access without subscription administration. For AWS, evaluate identity policies, resource policies, boundaries, session restrictions and organization controls together; a single allow statement does not establish effective access. [IAM evaluation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_evaluation-logic.html)

**3. Follow a business object through storage and jobs.** Create one canary document in tenant A and another in B. Exercise upload, preview, export, asynchronous processing, attachment download, sharing and deletion. Compare the authenticated caller with the tenant supplied in URLs, object keys, job messages and signing requests. Inspect authorization at both submission and retrieval: a protected export creation endpoint can still produce an unprotected result URL.

Presigned URLs are bearer capabilities. Sharing one can intentionally grant access until expiry; this alone is not IDOR. Investigate unauthorized URL issuance, a signature covering the wrong object/method, excess lifetime against a documented requirement, or ability to replace a different tenant's object. AWS documents that their usable lifetime also depends on the signing credentials. [S3 presigned URLs](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/using-presigned-url.html)

**4. Inspect Kubernetes boundaries before attempting runtime behavior.** Determine whether the promise is namespace separation, virtual control planes, dedicated nodes or dedicated clusters. Namespaces require supporting authorization, networking and storage controls; creating a NetworkPolicy object does not prove enforcement by the CNI. Map ingress, pod egress, persistent volumes and shared controller privileges separately. [Kubernetes multi-tenancy](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/multi-tenancy/)

Review workload-creation permission as a capability to select service accounts and mount namespace resources. Inspect `bind`, `escalate`, `impersonate`, token-request and `nodes/proxy` grants; even a `get` on `nodes/proxy` is not necessarily read only. Do not dump Secrets to prove that `list` reveals their content. Use permission review, supplied policy exports and a deliberately created canary instead. [RBAC risks](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/)

**5. Review admission and controllers as separate authorization layers.** Check create/update coverage, resource/subresource matches, exclusions, namespace labels, mutating order and webhook failure behavior. A low-privilege custom resource can be consumed by a powerful operator: inspect whether it can nominate another namespace, secret reference, service account, volume or external destination. In an isolated cluster, compare the requested object, admission decision and controller-produced object. Server dry-run contacts admission components and is not an offline safety guarantee. [Admission guidance](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/admission-webhooks-good-practices/)

**6. Trace IaC and container assumptions into deployment.** Inspect default values, conditional branches, environment overlays, chart rendering, mutable image references and identity bindings. A repository warning becomes a strong finding when a supported deployment creates an unintended reachable boundary. Pin the image digest, map the vulnerable code to that image, and separate container UID 0 from proven host privilege. Review privileged mode, host namespaces, host mounts and capabilities against the deployment's isolation promise. [Pod Security Standards](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/)

Terraform's `sensitive` flag redacts normal display; it does not automatically remove values from state. Review state/plan access and secret lifetimes, while treating any obtained state as sensitive evidence. Never run unreviewed provider binaries or provisioning code with workstation credentials. [Terraform sensitive data](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/language/manage-sensitive-data)

## Hypotheses, controlled tests and evidence

The following are test-design recommendations; prerequisites must be satisfied before execution.

| Hypothesis | Minimum controlled test | Evidence and interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Tenant supplied by the client controls the signing identity | Ask as A for a signed URL naming B's owned canary, then perform only the permitted canary read | A identity, B object ownership, signing request, resulting canary bytes. Ordinary use of a legitimately issued share URL is a negative control. |
| A queued job loses caller authorization | Submit a benign export, revoke A's access to its own fixture, then request the result | Job ID, before/after access state, export timestamp and documented revocation semantics. Do not assume immediate revocation is promised. |
| Fetcher follows an unsafe destination | Send one URL to an owned callback; test redirect handling entirely between owned endpoints | Unique nonce and callback log prove server-side fetching only. They do not prove metadata access or credential theft. Use a mock metadata service in a local replica for that path. |
| IAM trust is broader than the integration contract | Compare supplied trust conditions and principal restrictions against two owned identities | Exact policies and denied/allowed benign operation. Treat missing conditions as a hypothesis until their security consequence is shown. |
| A controller trusts cross-namespace references | In a local cluster, have tenant A reference tenant B's synthetic object through one supported custom resource | Custom resource, reconciler identity, generated object and synthetic result; isolate controller behavior from a direct RBAC bypass. |
| Admission excludes a supported update path | Compare normal creation and one equivalent update using a harmless lab workload | Both requests, policy match information and final security context. Never deploy a privileged production workload just to strengthen evidence. |
| Template defaults undermine isolation | Render the supported configuration; inspect policy and reproduce with local fixtures | Commit, values file, rendered resource, reachable boundary and secure comparison. A linter finding alone is not demonstrated exploitation. |

## Checklist

- [ ] Exact account/project/subscription, resource owner and active principal match scope.
- [ ] CSP policy and bounty policy both cover the method; third-party integrations are identified.
- [ ] Test tenants A/B, synthetic objects and baseline denied requests exist.
- [ ] Management plane, data plane, storage signing and background jobs are separately mapped.
- [ ] IAM inheritance and restrictions are considered; exported policy is not mistaken for effective permission.
- [ ] Cluster, namespace, CNI, admission, operator and node boundaries are distinguished.
- [ ] Workload creation and sensitive RBAC verbs are reviewed without reading real secrets.
- [ ] Image/module digest, supported deployment mode and runtime reachability are recorded.
- [ ] SSRF proof uses owned callbacks; impact beyond the callback remains explicitly unproven.
- [ ] The report contains one minimum boundary violation, redacted evidence and cleanup status.

## Command cheat sheet

Use installed official CLIs, your own configured lab credentials and the literal approved IDs. These eight commands read configuration or perform local validation; none grants permission to broaden scope. Do not substitute credentials found in a repository. Protect output files because policies and identities can be confidential.

```bash
# 1. Confirm the AWS principal; no secret value is printed.
aws --profile bounty-lab sts get-caller-identity --output json --no-cli-pager

# 2. Inspect one owned general-purpose bucket's policy status.
aws --profile bounty-lab s3api get-bucket-policy-status \
  --bucket YOUR_OWN_BUCKET --expected-bucket-owner YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID \
  --output json --no-cli-pager

# 3. Confirm Azure's selected subscription and tenant.
az account show --query '{subscription:id,tenant:tenantId,user:user.name}' -o json

# 4. Read the policy attached to one owned GCP project.
gcloud projects get-iam-policy YOUR_OWN_PROJECT_ID --format=json

# 5. Ask permission without reading the canary Secret.
kubectl --context bounty-lab -n tenant-a auth can-i get secrets/bounty-canary

# 6. Review only the owned namespace's configuration.
kubectl --context bounty-lab -n tenant-a get roles,rolebindings,networkpolicies -o json

# 7. Inspect a local image without executing its entrypoint.
docker image inspect YOUR_LOCAL_IMAGE --format '{{.Id}} {{json .Config.User}}'

# 8. Validate a trusted, already-initialized local Terraform module.
terraform -chdir=./owned-lab-iac validate -json
```

Command references: [AWS identity](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/sts/get-caller-identity.html), [bucket status](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/s3api/get-bucket-policy-status.html), [Azure account](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/account?view=azure-cli-latest), [GCP policy](https://docs.cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/projects/get-iam-policy), [kubectl permission query](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/kubectl_auth_can-i/), [Kubernetes RBAC](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/), [Docker inspect](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/inspect/), [Terraform validate](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/cli/commands/validate).

Interpret results narrowly: bucket policy status is not a complete audit of all object-access paths; a GCP project policy does not enumerate every inherited control; `can-i` evaluates authorization, not admission or exploitability; `terraform validate` checks configuration validity, not security. Terraform may invoke installed provider plugins, so “local” does not mean safe for an untrusted repository.

## Provider-specific execution branch

Use [Azure and GCP boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/azure-gcp-boundaries.html) alongside the shared IAM and storage procedures. Azure testing must distinguish Entra data roles from management authority, account-key access and SAS. GCP testing must distinguish service-account attachment from token creation, and bucket IAM from object ACLs where those remain enabled. The module includes bounded policy and single-object metadata commands with explicit authentication assumptions.

Map each observed result to its actual credential path. If an SDK or CLI silently changes from user authentication to account keys or an impersonated service account, rerun the comparison with the intended identity before calling it an authorization bypass.

## Sources

All accessed 11 September 2026. Match living documentation to the target version.

| Publisher | Source | Publication or version |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services | [Penetration Testing](https://aws.amazon.com/security/penetration-testing/) | Undated |
| Microsoft Security Response Center | [Microsoft Security Testing Rules of Engagement](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/pentest-rules-of-engagement) | Undated |
| Google | [Cloud Security FAQ](https://support.google.com/cloud/answer/6262505?hl=en) | Undated |
| Amazon Web Services | [Policy evaluation logic](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_evaluation-logic.html) | Undated |
| Amazon Web Services | [Download and upload objects with presigned URLs](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/using-presigned-url.html) | Undated |
| Kubernetes | [Multi-tenancy](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/multi-tenancy/) | Undated living documentation |
| Kubernetes | [Role Based Access Control Good Practices](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/) | Undated living documentation |
| Kubernetes | [Admission Webhook Good Practices](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/admission-webhooks-good-practices/) | Undated living documentation |
| Kubernetes | [Pod Security Standards](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/) | Undated living documentation |
| Kubernetes | [Using RBAC Authorization](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/) | Undated living documentation |
| HashiCorp | [Manage sensitive data in your configuration](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/language/manage-sensitive-data) | Undated |
| Amazon Web Services | [get-caller-identity — AWS CLI v2 Command Reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/sts/get-caller-identity.html) | Undated living documentation |
| Amazon Web Services | [get-bucket-policy-status — AWS CLI v2 Command Reference](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/s3api/get-bucket-policy-status.html) | Undated living documentation |
| Microsoft Learn | [az account](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/account?view=azure-cli-latest) | Undated living documentation |
| Google Cloud | [gcloud projects get-iam-policy](https://docs.cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/projects/get-iam-policy) | Undated living documentation |
| Kubernetes | [kubectl auth can-i](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/kubectl_auth_can-i/) | Undated living documentation |
| Docker | [docker image inspect](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/inspect/) | Undated |
| HashiCorp | [terraform validate command reference](https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/cli/commands/validate) | Undated |


## Shared investigation procedures

- [Object, function, and property authorization](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/authz-matrix.html) — Turn identities, tenants, objects, roles, and lifecycle transitions into a reproducible permission matrix.
- [Authentication, recovery, federation, and session lifecycle](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/identity-session.html) — Test registration, recovery, identity changes, invitations, SSO enforcement, and deprovisioning as one account state machine.
- [Trace input into queries, commands, and templates](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/injection-tracing.html) — Prove interpretation at a specific sink using small paired experiments instead of payload spraying.
- [Server-side fetching and network trust boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/ssrf-boundary.html) — Separate an intended fetch from a request that reaches a prohibited destination, forwards authority, or exposes a protected response.
- [Uploads, downloads, paths, archives, and XML](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/file-boundaries.html) — Follow a file through acceptance, storage, processing, publication, and retrieval while preserving ownership and path boundaries.
- [Workflow invariants, replay, idempotency, and races](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/state-business-logic.html) — Find security consequences in workflow ordering and concurrency, with serial controls and durable-state evidence.
- [REST, GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, and SSE permission parity](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/api-protocols.html) — Carry the same permission invariant across protocols, nested fields, streams, and alternate API versions.
- [Proxy normalization, cache isolation, and request boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/proxy-cache.html) — Investigate layered HTTP behavior with isolated cache keys and controlled front-end/back-end traffic.
- [CI and releases: trace untrusted input into privileged work](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/supply-chain-ci.html) — Audit workflow events, shell interpolation, untrusted builds, artifact consumers, and release identity as one privilege chain.
- [Dependencies: from advisory match to reachable impact](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/dependency-reachability.html) — Separate composition, advisory matching, runtime reachability, and exploit prerequisites so dependency reports describe product impact.
- [Cloud IAM: trust, delegation and effective permissions](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/cloud-iam-boundaries.html) — Prove which principal can act on which resource, including cross-account trust, delegated roles and workload federation.
- [Object storage, signed URLs and delivery boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/storage-delivery.html) — Follow one private canary through upload, signing, CDN delivery and expiry without enumerating real objects.
- [Container and Kubernetes isolation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/container-kubernetes.html) — Test RBAC, workload identity, admission, networking and host exposure as separate enforcement layers.
- [Infrastructure configuration: from repository default to deployed impact](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/infrastructure-config.html) — Trace IaC, charts, Compose and image packaging into supported deployments, including exposed services and sensitive artifacts.
- [DNS, TLS and email trust boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/dns-tls-mail.html) — Separate dangling records, transfer/recursion exposure, TLS identity and SMTP relay into controlled protocol tests.
- [Database, cache, queue and management service boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/network-service-boundaries.html) — Move from a reachable socket to a minimal proof of unintended service authority using synthetic records and paired identities.
- [MFA and passkeys: enrollment, proof, replacement, and recovery](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/authenticator-lifecycle.html) — Follow each authenticator from account binding to removal, and validate WebAuthn assertions without mistaking client UI or counter behavior for a security guarantee.
- [OAuth, OIDC, and SAML: transaction binding and token trust](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/federation-token-trust.html) — Separate browser transaction binding, issuer trust, token purpose, and identity linking using controlled federation fixtures.
- [Request values: duplicate parameters, parser conflicts and downstream queries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/request-value-parsing.html) — Trace the value a security layer validates through to the value the application or downstream service actually consumes.
- [Webhooks and integration events: authenticity, tenant binding and replay](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/webhook-event-integrity.html) — Verify the event signature, provider-to-tenant binding and durable worker effect together across retries and out-of-order delivery.
- [GitLab pipelines: contribution, job token and runner boundaries](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/gitlab-pipeline-boundaries.html) — Trace GitLab execution context, included configuration, downstream inputs, job-token permissions and runner reuse using private synthetic fixtures.
- [Azure and GCP: identity, delegation and storage access](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/azure-gcp-boundaries.html) — Apply provider-specific controls for Azure management/data permissions and SAS, plus GCP service accounts, federation and object ACLs.
- [Resource budgets and sensitive business flows](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/modules/resource-budget-controls.html) — Trace request fan-out, retries, recipient limits and tenant quotas using tiny local limits, recording stubs and measured downstream effects.

## Vulnerability reference

- [Broken object-level authorization (BOLA / IDOR)](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/bola-controlled-object-access.html)
- [Broken function-level authorization (BFLA)](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/bfla-restricted-function.html)
- [Mass assignment of server-controlled properties](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/mass-assignment-protected-property.html)
- [Authentication or MFA state bypass](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/authentication-incomplete-state-bypass.html)
- [Residual access after explicit session revocation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/session-revocation-residual-access.html)
- [OAuth login or account-linking confusion](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/oauth-login-account-linking-confusion.html)
- [JWT signature, issuer, audience, or token-purpose validation failure](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/jwt-signature-trust-failure.html)
- [OS command injection](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/os-command-argument-boundary.html)
- [Server-side request forgery (SSRF)](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/ssrf-forbidden-destination.html)
- [Path traversal outside an allowed root](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/path-traversal-controlled-canary.html)
- [Web cache poisoning](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/web-cache-poisoning-unkeyed-input.html)
- [Web cache deception](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/web-cache-deception-private-response.html)
- [HTTP request smuggling / desynchronization](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/http-request-boundary-desynchronization.html)
- [Race condition in a security-sensitive transition](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/race-condition-duplicate-transition.html)
- [Workflow order or approval bypass](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/workflow-order-validation-bypass.html)
- [Single-use action or idempotency replay failure](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/single-use-idempotency-replay.html)
- [Hard-coded product credentials](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/hardcoded-credentials.html)
- [CI metadata interpreted as executable script](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/ci-script-injection.html)
- [Untrusted contribution executed by privileged CI](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/ci-untrusted-code-execution.html)
- [CI artifact poisoning across a workflow trust boundary](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/ci-artifact-poisoning.html)
- [Dependency confusion and unintended package origin](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/dependency-confusion.html)
- [Predictable temporary files and unsafe creation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/insecure-temporary-files.html)
- [Untrusted executable, library, or module search path](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/untrusted-search-path.html)
- [Overbroad cloud role trust](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-iam-role-trust.html)
- [Excessive service-role delegation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-passrole-escalation.html)
- [Federated cloud role accepts the wrong workload identity](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-oidc-subject-scope.html)
- [Anonymous access to private object storage](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-storage-anonymous-read.html)
- [Unauthorized object creation or replacement](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-storage-unauthorized-write.html)
- [Signed storage capability exceeds its authorized scope](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-presigned-capability-scope.html)
- [Private delivery policy bypassed through the origin](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/cloud-origin-access-bypass.html)
- [Kubernetes Secret access exceeds tenant permissions](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/kube-secret-rbac-exposure.html)
- [Workload creation grants unintended service-account authority](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/kube-workload-identity-selection.html)
- [Admission policy misses a supported object or update path](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/kube-admission-policy-gap.html)
- [Namespace or workload network restriction is ineffective](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/kube-network-isolation-failure.html)
- [Container exposes unintended host files or privileges](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/container-host-resource-exposure.html)
- [Sensitive values exposed through state or plan artifacts](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/iac-state-secret-exposure.html)
- [Secrets retained in container build artifacts](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/container-build-secret-leak.html)
- [Supported deployment default exposes a protected service](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/iac-insecure-supported-default.html)
- [Dangling DNS reference to a retired service](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/dns-dangling-resource-reference.html)
- [Redis authentication or key ACL boundary failure](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/redis-canary-access.html)
- [PostgreSQL trust authentication exceeds the approved network boundary](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/postgres-unintended-trust-auth.html)
- [Message broker permissions cross a virtual-host boundary](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/queue-virtual-host-boundary.html)
- [Container daemon management endpoint lacks required client authentication](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/container-daemon-client-auth.html)
- [TLS peer certificate or hostname verification failure](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/client-invalid-certificate.html)
- [Exposed repository or history secret](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/exposed-repository-secret.html)
- [Untrusted Host or forwarding-header origin construction](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/host-header-origin-trust.html)
- [SAML assertion signature, audience, or response binding failure](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/saml-assertion-trust.html)
- [Unauthorized authenticator enrollment, replacement, or removal](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/authenticator-management-proof-bypass.html)
- [WebAuthn assertion accepted for an invalid account or ceremony context](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/webauthn-assertion-binding-failure.html)
- [Verification or account merge preserves another actor's access](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/identity-verification-merge-confusion.html)
- [Enforced SSO bypass through an alternate login path](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/enforced-sso-alternate-login-bypass.html)
- [Argument or option injection without shell interpretation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/process-argument-option-injection.html)
- [Parameter or JSON parser disagreement crosses a security check](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/request-parser-value-conflict.html)
- [Server-side parameter pollution in a constructed request](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/downstream-parameter-injection.html)
- [Unverified or tampered webhook causes a protected effect](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/webhook-event-authenticity-failure.html)
- [Authentic integration event applied to the wrong tenant or object](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/webhook-provider-tenant-binding.html)
- [GitLab job token crosses an unintended project boundary](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/gitlab-job-token-boundary.html)
- [Shared CI runner exposes private state across jobs](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/ci-runner-cross-job-state.html)
- [Unbounded resource allocation or request amplification](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/resource-allocation-limit-failure.html)
- [Sensitive business flow exceeds its permitted frequency or allocation](https://bug-bounty-field-manual.kmahshooq.chatgpt.site/vulnerabilities/sensitive-flow-frequency-limit.html)